PUBLIC MATTER—DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

 Filed October 25, 2023

**STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA**

**REVIEW DEPARTMENT**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| In the Matter ofTHOMAS JOHN SPIELBAUER,State Bar No. 78281. | )))))) | SBC-19-O-30700OPINION[As Modified on October 27, 2023] |

This case provides an opportunity to clarify Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (o)(2),[[1]](#footnote-2) and the limitations to ordering restitution, particularly to non-clients, as a condition of probation. In this contested disciplinary matter, Thomas John Spielbauer is charged with five counts of misconduct primarily concerning his actions in connection with his corporation, Devine Blessings Inc., and an underlying civil lawsuit in Santa Clara County, *167 E. William LLC v. Devine Blessings, et al*.[[2]](#footnote-3) The hearing judge found Spielbauer culpable of four of the five counts and recommended a 90-day actual suspension.

Both Spielbauer and the Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar (OCTC) appeal. OCTC requests we find Spielbauer culpable under each of the five counts and argues that six months’ actual suspension until restitution is paid is the appropriate discipline. Spielbauer argues the hearing judge unfairly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the underlying state court proceedings, which he claims denied him due process in this disciplinary matter. He asserts all counts should be dismissed, or in the alternative, the case should be remanded to the Hearing Department. He also challenges the imposition of disciplinary costs and the restitution order, and he disputes certain evidentiary and procedural rulings made by the judge.

Upon our independent review of the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12), we find Spielbauer culpable of four counts—including failing to comply with Civil Code section 2943,[[3]](#footnote-4) moral turpitude for making two misrepresentations, and failing to report a civil fraud judgment to the State Bar. We also affirm most of the hearing judge’s aggravation and mitigation findings. Given Spielbauer’s serious misconduct, which involves two counts of moral turpitude, the applicable disciplinary standards and case law support an actual suspension of six months to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.

# PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

OCTC filed a Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) on December 16, 2019, alleging five counts of misconduct including violations of (1) Section 6068, subdivision (a) (failure to comply with Civil Code section 2943); (2) section 6068, subdivision (a) (failure to comply with Civil Code Section 3294); (3) section 6106 (moral turpitude—misrepresentation); (4) section 6106 (moral turpitude—misrepresentation); and (5) section 6068, subdivision (o)(2) (failure to report civil fraud judgment). Spielbauer filed a response on January 10, 2020. The matter was abated from March 2020 through April 4, 2022, due to scheduling complications arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

A two-day disciplinary trial was held by video on August 30 and September 1, 2022. Posttrial briefing followed, and the hearing judge issued her decision on December 2. Spielbauer filed his request for review on December 14. Oral arguments were heard on August 17, 2023, and the matter was submitted that day.

# RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND[[4]](#footnote-5)

 Spielbauer was admitted to practice law in California on December 21, 1977. He practiced criminal law for 20 years prior to starting a civil practice in 2005, with a focus on foreclosure law.

On March 5, 2010, Spielbauer incorporated Devine Blessings, Inc. (Devine Blessings), and he served as the president and sole shareholder of the company. Devine Blessings was created with a specific purpose to “secure financing and purchase lien position notes, particularly on the properties of Dennis Spielbauer” that were subject to foreclosure. Dennis, Spielbauer’s brother, was facing bankruptcy at the time the corporation was formed.[[5]](#footnote-6)

## The Underlying Civil Litigation

### Loans to Dennis and Subsequent Purchase by Devine Blessings

In 2003 and 2007, Dennis received two loans from real estate investor Curtis Mitchell, in the amounts of $350,000 and $585,000, respectively. The 2003 loan was secured by three properties owned by Dennis, including a property located at 167 E. William Street in San Jose, California (167 Property), placing Mitchell in second position on the 167 Property. The 2007 loan was secured by three different properties, one of which was Dennis’s personal residence. By 2010, the balance on the 2003 loan was $7,152.03. In 2008, Faramarz and Afsaneh Yazdani, as trustees of their family trust (Yazdani Trust), loaned Dennis $210,000, secured by a deed of trust on five parcels, including the 167 Property. By March 2010, the 167 Property was the only property remaining in Dennis’s ownership, and the Yazdani Trust was in third position on the 167 Property. Dennis ultimately defaulted on his loans, and Mitchell sought foreclosure proceedings on Dennis’s residence and the 167 Property, which resulted in Dennis filing for bankruptcy.

Just prior to the foreclosure sales, on March 12, 2010, Spielbauer, on behalf of Devine Blessings, agreed to purchase the 2003 and 2007 loans from Mitchell for $126,000, and Mitchell agreed to stop the foreclosure proceeding on Dennis’s residence. The purchase agreement was drafted by Spielbauer, and pursuant to the language of the agreement, the transaction was between Mitchell and “Spielbauer or the business entity he is an officer, director, or managing member of [sic].” During negotiation of the agreement, Mitchell repeatedly asked Spielbauer to acknowledge in writing that of the $126,000, only $7,152.03 related to the 167 Property (the outstanding balance on the 2003 loan), and the remainder related to the 2007 loan secured by Dennis’s residence. Spielbauer refused, stating, “I’m not signing them. I have my own reasons for not signing them. I can’t tell you what they are, but they do not involve you.” Mitchell, believing Spielbauer’s behavior was very odd, documented Spielbauer’s statements and had the documentation witnessed by an escrow officer.

### The Payoff Demand

On March 25, 2010, the Yazdani Trust foreclosed on the sale of the 167 Property and then transferred title to a newly formed company, 167 E. William, LLC (William LLC). William LLC sought to resell the 167 Property to a third party, and in order to clear title, requested a payoff demand statement from Spielbauer pursuant to Civil Code section 2943, subdivision (b).[[6]](#footnote-7) Spielbauer provided William LLC with a written payoff demand, stating that the balance owed on the 167 Property was $126,000, and that an additional $143,500 was owed for “other” (which was unspecified), amounting to a total demand of $269,500. Spielbauer did not disclose that the actual balance owed on the loan secured by the 167 Property was $7,152.03.

William LLC contacted Spielbauer inquiring why the payoff demand was so high and requested an accounting, but Spielbauer did not respond. William LLC then attempted to contact Spielbauer through counsel and warned that it would pursue a civil action for tortious interference, because the payoff demand was inflated and was jeopardizing the sale of the 167 Property. Spielbauer responded to the second communication and asserted that he did not have time to investigate the accuracy of the payoff demand submitted. Ultimately, Spielbauer never produced an accounting or explanation of the payoff demand. As a result, William LLC canceled the sale, refunded the third-party buyer’s deposit, and reimbursed the buyer for additional costs incurred.

### William LLC Initiates a Civil Lawsuit

On July 6, 2010, William LLC filed a civil action against Spielbauer and Devine Blessings in the Santa Clara County Superior Court. William LLC brought several causes of action, including tort causes of action for intentional interference with economic advantage, negligent interference with economic relations, slander of title, and violations of Civil Code section 2943. William LLC alleged, in part, that Spielbauer proffered an inaccurate payoff demand statement with respect to the 167 Property, and it sought damages. In April 2013, after the superior court held a two-day bench trial, the court concluded that Spielbauer’s payoff demand was inaccurate and violated Civil Code section 2943.[[7]](#footnote-8) Subsequently, on the issue of punitive damages, the court concluded that Spielbauer intentionally presented an inaccurate payoff demand to deprive William LLC of property or legal rights, committing fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a).[[8]](#footnote-9) The court reasoned that Spielbauer presented the false payoff demand, because he intended to seek payment from William LLC to cover his attorney fees for working on Dennis’s bankruptcy and to shift the burden of paying the remaining mortgage on Dennis’s residence to William LLC. The court further found that Spielbauer knew it would force William LLC to pay the false payoff demand “as ransom” or lose the sale of the house to the third-party buyer.

On February 20, 2014, the superior court entered judgment against Spielbauer and Devine Blessings. Spielbauer was ordered to pay William LLC $869,276.55, which included $332,550 in punitive damages. Spielbauer appealed. The Court of Appeal issued an unpublished opinion on May 10, 2016, affirming the superior court’s judgment and finding no merit to Spielbauer’s claims. Spielbauer sought review by the California Supreme Court, but his petition was denied.

## OCTC Investigation

 On June 20, 2014, an OCTC investigator wrote to Spielbauer inquiring about the civil judgment the superior court issued against him in theWilliammatter. The investigator stated OCTC did not have a record of Spielbauer reporting the fraud judgment as required under section 6068, subdivision (o)(2). On July 11, Spielbauer responded to the OCTC investigator’s inquiry. In his written response, Spielbauer stated that because the civil judgment was entered against him in his capacity as the president of Devine Blessings and did not arise from his practice of law, he did not deem it reportable under section 6068, subdivision (o)(2). To date, Spielbauer has not made any payment toward satisfying the $869,276.55 civil judgment.

# CULPABILITY[[9]](#footnote-10)

## Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel

Over Spielbauer’s objection, the hearing judge granted OCTC’s pretrial motion to apply collateral estoppel, thereby excluding the relitigation of specific topics argued and decided in the underlying superior court proceedings. On review, Spielbauer contends that the judge should not have applied collateral estoppel to counts one through four in the disciplinary proceeding, claiming it resulted in unfairness. He asserts that all relevant issues were not litigated in the superior court, due to his counsel’s alleged inadequate representation, which Spielbauer claims caused the court to make erroneous findings. As analyzed below, we find that the judge properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in finding respondent culpable in counts one, three, and four.[[10]](#footnote-11)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating a matter in a subsequent proceeding that has been fully litigated and determined in a prior proceeding. (*Wright v. Ripley* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1193.) Collateral estoppel may be applied to State Bar Court proceedings in order to prevent an attorney from relitigating an issue resolved adversely to the attorney in a prior civil proceeding. (*In the Matter of Kittrell* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 195, 205.)

In order for collateral estoppel to apply in State Bar Court proceedings, the following requirements must be established: (1) the issues that resulted in the civil court findings are substantially identical to the issues before the State Bar Court; (2) the findings were decided under the same burden of proof applicable to the State Bar Court—clear and convincing evidence; (3) the attorney was a party to the civil proceeding; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the civil case; and (5) no unfairness in precluding relitigation was proven by the attorney. (*In the Matter of Kittrell*, *supra*, 4 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 205.) There is no dispute that requirements one through four in applying collateral estoppel were established here.

Turning to the fifth and final requirement, a party may demonstrate it would be unfair to bind him or her to the superior court findings if he or she shows “among other things, (1) that he or she had less incentive or motive to litigate the issue in the civil proceeding, (2) that the civil finding or judgment is itself inconsistent with some other finding or judgment, or (3) that he or she was required to litigate under different and less advantageous procedures in the civil proceeding. [Citation.]” (*In the Matter of Applicant A* (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 318, 329.)

Spielbauer’s unfairness argument is rooted in his belief that the superior court’s finding—that he presented an inaccurate payoff demand amounting to fraud—was erroneous because the court relied on a misinterpretation of the deed of trust. He maintains that the payoff demand was not falsified and claims there is additional evidence to support his belief that was never argued or considered by the superior court. This argument does not satisfy any of the above scenarios constituting unfairness. And the existence of additional evidence that was not considered by the superior court does not prohibit the application of collateral estoppel. (*Roos v. Red* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 888 [claim of new evidence will not defeat collateral estoppel where evidence available at first hearing].) In its decision, the superior court stated Spielbauer “testified that he believed he had entered into a modification of the note . . . [yet he] had the opportunity to present the written document itself . . . but he failed to do so.” Spielbauer also provided no explanation to the superior court as to how the note was modified.[[11]](#footnote-12) We find Spielbauer has failed to demonstrate unfairness in precluding relitigation.

As OCTC points out in its brief, Spielbauer had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issues and raise his arguments in the superior court as well as the opportunity for appellate review. (See *Roos v. Red*, *supra*, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 880.) Although Spielbauer claims his counsel “fatally compromised” his case in superior court, this is belied by the fact that Spielbauer participated in the litigation for a period of time as counsel for Devine Blessings, and he actively advocated for himself when dissatisfied with his counsel’s objections. We find the doctrine of collateral estoppel was correctly applied by the hearing judge to establish culpability for Spielbauer’s misconduct as detailed below.

## Count One: Section 6068(a)—Failure to Comply with Civil Code section 2943

Section 6068, subdivision (a), requires an attorney to “support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state.” In count one, OCTC charged Spielbauer with violating section 6068, subdivision (a), based upon the superior court’s findings that he violated Civil Code section 2943 by failing to submit an accurate payoff demand statement to William LLC. Based upon the hearing judge’s collateral estoppel ruling, she found Spielbauer culpable as charged. We agree.

Under Civil Code section 2943, subdivision (e)(4), Spielbauer was required to provide a payoff demand statement setting forth the financial obligations of the loan to William LLC within 21 days of its request. The superior court found that Spielbauer knew the $269,500 payoff demand he submitted to William LLC was false and should have been $7,152. By ultimately providing a false statement claiming the outstanding balance was considerably more than the amount due, Spielbauer violated Civil Code section 2943, subdivision (e)(4). This violation resulted in liability for his tortious interference by preventing William LLC from closing a prospective transaction, as the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence.

On review, Spielbauer attempts to relitigate the merits of the superior court case to contest culpability under count one. He cannot do so, because he is collaterally estopped from challenging the superior court’s findings that he intentionally violated Civil Code sections 2943. As discussed above, based upon our independent review of the evidence, we find that the issues pertinent to count one are properly disposed under collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we affirm the hearing judge’s findings and conclude that the record fully supports culpability for Spielbauer’s failure to comply with the laws of California in violation of section 6068, subdivision (a), as charged under count one. We assign no additional disciplinary weight for this violation because the misconduct underlying the section 6106 violation in counts three and four supports the same or greater discipline. (*In the Matter of Sampson* (Review Dept. 1994)

3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 119, 127.)

## Count Two: Section 6068(a)—Failure to Comply with Civil Code section 3294

In count two, OCTC charged Spielbauer with violating section 6068, subdivision (a), based upon the superior court’s findings that his actions were fraudulent within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294. Similar to count one, the hearing judge found culpability for count two on collateral estoppel grounds. Specifically, the hearing judge determined Spielbauer violated 6068, subdivision (a), because he was found to have committed fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(3), by intentionally misrepresenting the amount owed on the 167 Property and submitting a false payoff demand, which deprived William LLC of its legal rights and assets. OCTC requests that we affirm culpability under count two.

Civil Code section 3294 is a punitive damages statute which allows a court to award punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages in cases where a defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Although the superior court determined Spielbauer committed fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(3), we conclude that assigning culpability under section 6068, subdivision (a), is not appropriate, because Civil Code section 3294 itself does not prescribe a legal obligation amounting to a disciplinable offense. (*In the Matter of Riley* (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 91, 111 [effect of § 6068, subd. (a), is to make it a disciplinable offense when an attorney does not uphold the law unless the result of negligent good faith mistake].) Section 6068, subdivision (a), is “a conduit by which attorneys may be charged and disciplined for violations of otherspecific laws which are not otherwise made disciplinable under the State Bar Act.” (*In the Matter of Lilley* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 476, 487.) Here, there can be no finding that Spielbauer failed to “support” Civil Code section 3294, within the meaning of section 6068, subdivision (a), because that Civil Code section is not an actionable statute; it is solely a mechanism to award damages.

Further, the charged misconduct under count two is premised on the same facts that we consider in supporting a culpability finding for the section 6106 moral turpitude violation in count three, which we believe more appropriately defines Spielbauer’s misconduct for the purpose of attorney discipline. Accordingly, we dismiss count two with prejudice. (*In the Matter of Kroff* (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 838, 843 [dismissal of charges for want of proof after trial on merits is with prejudice].)

## Counts Three and Four: Section 6106—Moral Turpitude (Misrepresentation)

Section 6106 provides that any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise, constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension. In count three, OCTC alleged that Spielbauer committed an act of moral turpitude by intentionally providing a false payoff demand to William LLC for $269,500, which he knew was false and misleading. Similarly, in count four, Spielbauer was charged with violating section 6106 by submitting a declaration in superior court, which contained a payoff demand statement that he knew was inaccurate. The hearing judge found Spielbauer culpable under both counts and determined that his misrepresentations were willful.

By applying collateral estoppel, the hearing judge determined the superior court’s finding that Spielbauer committed fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), established his culpability under count three. We agree. Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(3), defines fraud as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” The superior court expressly determined that Spielbauer intentionally presented an inaccurate payoff demand, knowing it was false, to deprive William LLC of its property and legal rights, thereby committing fraud, in violation of Civil Code section 3294, which the Court of Appeal later affirmed.

On review, Spielbauer argues that, even if the payoff demand was inaccurate, he had a good faith belief that it was true when submitted. He also claims that he was permitted to modify the promissory note under relevant legal authorities.[[12]](#footnote-13) We find Spielbauer’s arguments are an impermissible attempt to relitigate the findings of the superior court, which are binding upon this court by collateral estoppel. Accordingly, Spielbauer is culpable of violating section 6106 as charged in count three.

Under count four, the hearing judge concluded, after applying collateral estoppel, that Spielbauer committed an intentional misrepresentation in violation of section 6106, when he submitted his September 14, 2010 declaration to the superior court, stating under penalty of perjury that the payoff demand was “an accurate payoff demand to the best of [his] knowledge, information and belief,” when, in fact, Spielbauer knew it was not. We affirm this finding.

Spielbauer claims that to be found culpable for a violation of section 6106, OCTC must prove he committed perjury in violation of Penal Code section 118. He is incorrect. An attorney is required to render complete and candid disclosures to the court. (*Mosesian v. State Bar* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 60, 66.) Acting otherwise constitutes moral turpitude and warrants discipline. (*Bach v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848, 855.) The declaration Spielbauer submitted to the superior court contained a misrepresentation regarding the payoff demand that was both material and intentional because he sought to mislead the court and secure an advantage in litigation, which constitutes moral turpitude. (*Grove v. State Bar* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 312, 315 [moral turpitude includes concealment as well as affirmative misrepresentations with no distinction to be drawn between “concealment, half-truth, and false statement of fact”]; see also *In the Matter of Chesnut* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 166, 174-175 [false statement made to tribunal is material when used to secure advantage in forum].) Accordingly, culpability is established by clear and convincing evidence under count four.

## Count Five: Section 6068(o)(2)—Failure to Report Fraud Judgment

 Section 6068, subdivision (o)(2), requires an attorney to report to the State Bar in writing within 30 days of the time the attorney has knowledge of “[t]he entry of judgment against the attorney in a civil action for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or gross negligence committed in a professional capacity.” Spielbauer was charged with violating section 6068, subdivision (o)(2), for failing to report to the State Bar, the superior court’s judgment against him, finding that he committed fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294. The hearing judge determined there was no culpability and dismissed this count. She found that section 6068, subdivision (o)(2), requires that a judgment entered against an attorney in a civil action for fraud must be “committed in a professional capacity.” The judge also viewed the phrase, “committed in a professional capacity,” to be ambiguous and concluded there was insufficient evidence in the record to support culpability because OCTC did not establish that Spielbauer was acting “in a professional capacity” when he presented the inaccurate payoff demand to William LLC and the superior court.

OCTC appeals the dismissal and argues that *any* judgment against an attorney for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty must be reported regardless of whether the attorney was engaged in the practice of law during the commission of the misconduct. It further maintains that, as the president of Devine Blessings and by representing the corporation in the William matter at certain periods during the litigation, Spielbauer acted “in a professional capacity.” Spielbauer requests we affirm the hearing judge’s dismissal and claims that OCTC’s interpretation of the statute is an overreach.

 In support of its position, OCTC asserts that the phrase, “committed in a professional capacity,” should be read to modify only the phrase that immediately precedes it, “gross negligence.” Its argument, raised for the first time on review, relies on the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, which generally provides that “‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ [Citations.]”  (*White v. County of Sacramento* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680.) Reliance on the last antecedent rule dates back at least a century in California, and “is often applied where there is a list of terms, and the qualifying word or phrases follow the last item on the list. [Citations].” (*Yahoo Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. etc.* (2022) 14 Cal.5th 58, 73-74.) That is, “a restrictive relative clause usually modifies the noun immediately preceding it.” (*Id.* at p. 74.)

 Applying the last antecedent rule to subdivision (o)(2) of section 6068, the phrase, “committed in a professional capacity,” modifies only the immediately preceding phrase, “or gross negligence.”  And the statute’s use of the word “or” “indicates an intention to use it disjunctively to designate alternative or separate categories.” (White v. County of Sacramento, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 680.)  We find this provides the more accurate and natural construction of the statute and is in consonance with well-established canons of statutory construction:

The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.] But ‘[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.’ [Citations.] Thus, ‘[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.’ [Citation.]

(*People v. Pieters* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898-899.)

The interpretation advanced by Spielbauer would limit reporting of adverse judgments only if the attorney’s fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duties was “committed in a professional capacity.” We find that this conclusion is contrary to the broader purpose of attorney discipline. The Supreme Court has held that attorneys must conform to professional standards in whatever capacity they are acting in a particular matter.  (*Crawford v. State Bar* (1960) 54 Cal. 2d 659, 668; see also *Mitton v. State Bar* (1958) 49 Cal.2d 686, 688-689.) And as OCTC points out, under section 6106, the Legislature makes an attorney’s commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption a cause for disbarment or suspension “whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney *or otherwise*.” (Italics added.) The civil judgment against Spielbauer involved an inaccurate payoff statement that the court found fraudulent; therefore, the State Bar has an interest in being made aware of the adverse judgment.

 Contrary to Spielbauer’s argument stating otherwise, he had a duty to report the superior court’s civil judgment to the State Bar within 30 days and failed to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the hearing judge’s dismissal of count five and find Spielbauer culpable of violating section 6068, subdivision (o)(2).

# EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES

 Spielbauer challenges the fairness of various aspects of his disciplinary proceeding. The standard of review we generally apply to procedural and evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. (*In the Matter of* *Aulakh* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 690, 695.) “[T]he appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. [Citations.]” (*H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1368.) Having considered each of his arguments, we find them meritless.

## Evidentiary Rulings

 Spielbauer argues the hearing judge erred by denying the admission of various exhibits, including a modification agreement on the promissory note between Dennis and Devine Blessings, several pleadings submitted in the state court proceedings, and the deposition transcripts of Glen Moss, a proposed expert witness. He asserts that the judge’s refusal to admit the evidence was prejudicial to him because the documents were relevant to demonstrate his alleged good faith as it relates to his submission of the payoff demand. He also argues these documents should have been admitted because they are referenced in his response to OCTC’s investigative letter, which is a part of the record. We are not persuaded.

 A hearing judge is afforded broad discretion to determine the admissibility and relevance of evidence.  (*In the Matter of Farrell* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490, 499.) To prevail on a claim of error, abuse of discretion and actual prejudice resulting from the ruling must be established. (*In the Matter of Johnson* (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 233, 241 [absent actual prejudice, party not entitled to relief from hearing judge’s evidentiary ruling].)  We agree with the judge’s determination that the documentary evidence pertaining to the state court proceedings was irrelevant.

 The hearing judge properly denied the admission of these documents due to her collateral estoppel rulings that we have upheld. The superior court’s factual findings are well supported by the record. And as set forth above, the excluded deposition testimony would not mitigate or excuse Spielbauer’s misconduct, which was established by clear and convincing evidence in the superior court. The judge acted within her discretion in denying the proffered evidence and we discern no error.

## Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

 Spielbauer’s argument that the hearing judge improperly granted his prior counsel’s request to withdraw is equally unavailing. Spielbauer claims he was denied due process and prejudiced by the withdrawal. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (*Matthews v. Eldridge* (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333.) Procedural due process generally includes an individual’s right to be adequately notified of charges or proceedings, the opportunity to be heard at these proceedings, and that the person or panel making the final decision in the proceedings be impartial. (*Id*. at pp. 332-333; *Goldberg v. Kelly* (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 267, 271.) When the judge granted counsel’s withdrawal motion, the case had been fully briefed and pretrial statements were submitted. The judge provided Spielbauer with a continuance of the May 24, 2022, disciplinary trial to July 19, so that he could obtain new counsel. During the two-day trial, Spielbauer actively participated and presented witnesses and evidence. Accordingly, we find that Spielbauer received due process and has not demonstrated the specific prejudice he allegedly suffered. (*In the Matter of Hertz* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 456, 469 [attorney must show specific prejudicial effect].)

## The Hearing Judge Did Not Exhibit Bias

Spielbauer, without citing supporting authority, requests dismissal or alternatively seeks for the matter to be remanded to the Hearing Department with the hearing judge recused from the proceedings. As discussed above, he argues that the judge made several adverse rulings against him and demonstrated an inability to adjudicate fairly and neutrally. He also asserts that the judge significantly favored OCTC. We disagree with Spielbauer’s contention that the judge was biased based on her evidentiary rulings against him. (*In the Matter of Johnson*, *supra*,

3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 241 [hearing judges have wide latitude in making evidentiary rulings and relief will not be granted without showing of actual prejudice]; *In the Matter of Frazier* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 676, 688-689 [rejecting overbroad bias claim].) Spielbauer has failed to establish that the judge exhibited bias or that he was specifically prejudiced. (*In the Matter of Kueker* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 583, 592 [respondent has burden to clearly establish bias and to show how he was specifically prejudiced].) We find through our independent review of the record that the judge acted properly and that Spielbauer received a fair trial. His request for a remand and recusal of the judge is denied.

# AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION

 Standard 1.5[[13]](#footnote-14) requires OCTC to establish aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. Standard 1.6 requires Spielbauer to meet the same burden to prove mitigating circumstances.

## Aggravation

### Multiple Acts (Std. 1.5(b))

The hearing judge found Spielbauer’s multiple acts of misconduct to be an aggravating circumstance. She assigned nominal weight in aggravation based on Spielbauer’s culpability for the two moral turpitude misrepresentation violations.[[14]](#footnote-15) Spielbauer does not challenge this finding. OCTC argues modest weight is warranted based on its assertion that Spielbauer is culpable under count five for his failure to report the fraud judgment entered against him.

Spielbauer is culpable of three ethical violations, which include attempting to defraud a third party by creating an inaccurate payoff demand, presenting the false payoff demand to the superior court in the underlying civil action, and failing to report the fraud judgment to the State Bar; therefore standard 1.5(b) applies. (*In the Matter of Bach* (Review Dept. 1991)

1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 631, 646–647 [three instances of misconduct considered multiple acts].) Since all of Spielbauer’s misconduct stemmed from one litigation matter and occurred over a relatively short period of time, limited weight is appropriate. (See *In the Matter of Riordan* (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.41,48 [little weight assigned to multiple acts for three counts involving similar misconduct].)

### Indifference (Std. 1.5(k))

Indifference toward rectification or atonement for the consequences of misconduct is an aggravating circumstance. An attorney who fails to accept responsibility for his actions and instead seeks to shift responsibility to others demonstrates indifference and lack of remorse. (*In the Matter of Wolff* (Review Dept. 2006) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 1, 14.) The hearing judge assigned substantial weight in aggravation for Spielbauer’s failure to appreciate the wrongfulness of his misconduct. OCTC requests that we affirm the judge’s aggravation under this circumstance. On review, Spielbauer appears to argue that indifference cannot be established because the present misconduct occurred in 2010 and he practiced for decades with a discipline-free record.

We agree that Spielbauer is unable to recognize the wrongfulness of his misconduct. While the law does not require false penitence, it does require that an attorney accept responsibility for wrongful acts and come to grips with culpability. (*In the Matter of Katz* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 502, 511.) Spielbauer has not done this, which demonstrates his lack of insight. Despite the superior court’s civil fraud judgment, Spielbauer maintains that his actions were supported under the law, and he has done nothing wrong. While Spielbauer is entitled to defend himself, his conduct goes beyond this, revealing a complete failure to understand the wrongfulness of his actions regarding the fraudulent payoff demand. Particularly troubling is his continued attempt in these proceedings to relitigate the findings of the superior court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeal and are fully supported by the record. (*In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 209 [unwillingness to consider appropriateness of legal challenge or acknowledge its lack of merit is aggravating].) Spielbauer’s actions show indifference to the nature and consequences of his misconduct, and we agree with the hearing judge and assign substantial weight in aggravation. (*In the Matter of Layton* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366, 380 [ongoing failure to acknowledge wrongdoing instills concern that attorney may commit future misconduct].)

### Failure to Make Restitution (Std. 1.5(m))

The hearing judge assigned substantial weight in aggravation because Spielbauer has not paid any portion the $869,276.55 civil judgment to William LLC, as ordered by the superior court. OCTC supports this finding. Spielbauer asserts he should not receive aggravation under this circumstance because attorney disciplinary proceedings are not “debt collection mechanisms.” He also relies on *Bach v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1201 to support his position that an attorney-client relationship is key for a restitution order. The attorney in *Bach* challenged a restitution order claiming that the State Bar and Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce restitution based on an outstanding arbitrator’s fee award to his prior client. (*Id*. at p. 1206.) However, the Supreme Court rejected Bach’s arguments and ordered restitution. (*Id*. at p. 1207.)

We also note that in *Galardi v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, the Supreme Court ordered an attorney to pay $186,000 in restitution owed to coventurers in real estate investment projects, despite the lack of any attorney-client relationship. Additionally, the Supreme Court has emphasized that part of the rationale for ordering restitution is to discourage dishonest and unprofessional conduct and to further the integrity of the profession. (*Coppock v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 665, 685.) Accordingly, we agree with the hearing judge’s finding and affirm substantial aggravation under this circumstance. (See *In the Matter of DeClue* (Review Dept. 2016) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 437, 445 [significant aggravation for failure to repay over $10,000].) Although we find Spielbauer’s failure to pay any portion of the civil judgment to date to be an aggravating factor, we decline to order restitution, as discussed below.

## Mitigation

### No Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.6(a))

 Standard 1.6(a) provides that “absence of any prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct, which is not likely to recur” is a mitigating circumstance. The hearing judge assigned moderate weight in mitigation for Spielbauer’s 30 years of discipline-free practice because she did not find that Spielbauer was unlikely to commit similar misconduct again. We agree.

While we acknowledge Spielbauer’s 30 years of discipline-free practice, his present misconduct was serious and consisted of fraud and moral turpitude based on his misrepresentations to the superior court and William LLC. It was also coupled with Spielbauer’s failure to make payment toward the civil judgment of $869,276.55. We cannot make a finding that such misconduct was aberrational or not likely to recur. Therefore, we assign moderate mitigation credit for Spielbauer’s lack of prior discipline. (See *Cooper v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1016, 1029 [when misconduct is serious, long record without discipline is most relevant when misconduct is aberrational].)

### Extraordinary Good Character (Std. 1.6(f))

 Spielbauer may obtain mitigation for “extraordinary good character attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities, who are aware of the full extent of the misconduct.” (Std. 1.6(f).) The hearing judge assigned limited weight in mitigation, finding that Spielbauer’s witnesses did not demonstrate they were aware of the full extent of the misconduct. OCTC supports the hearing judge’s findings. Spielbauer argues on review that the judge erroneously disregarded his good character evidence and asserts it is improper to require witnesses to presume that the allegations of the NDC are true. He further claims the witnesses were “vaguely aware of the allegations of an inflated payoff demand” and requests great weight in mitigation for good character.

 Testimonial evidence was taken from two attorneys and seven former clients. A letter was written by a former major gifts officer of a Catholic organization to which Spielbauer had made donations. We agree with the hearing’s judge’s determination that none of the witnesses were sufficiently aware of the conduct charged by OCTC.

We begin with the letter written by the former gifts officer. This individual has known Spielbauer for 20 years as a “generous donor.” She stated that Spielbauer “expressed the ideals” of the organization and “acted with integrity.” While generally positive, this letter does not demonstrate an awareness of the charges that were pending against Spielbauer.

Seven witnesses testifying on Spielbauer’s behalf were former clients, and they were all very satisfied with the legal services Spielbauer provided, trusted him, and believed he was honest. At most, three witnesses understood the charges against Spielbauer generally involved an “inflated payoff demand” with one of those witnesses testifying they involved “fraudulent charges.” None of the witnesses had read the charges, and Spielbauer had not sufficiently explained the allegations of misconduct to them.

Two other witnesses were attorneys. (*In the Matter of Brown* (Review Dept. 1993)

2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 309, 319 [serious consideration given to attorneys’ testimony due to their “strong interest in maintaining the honest administration of justice”].) One attorney, John Montoya, worked for many years in Monterey County and Los Angeles County and has known Spielbauer for 48 years, since law school. He testified that he was aware that a superior court judge found Spielbauer submitted a false payoff demand but thought Spielbauer would have acted in good faith and did not inquire further about the superior court judgment. Montoya acknowledged that he did not understand the State Bar charges, thought it would make Spielbauer uncomfortable to discuss them, and did not think it was “any of [his] business.”

The other attorney who testified was Stanley Zlotoff, who was previously Spielbauer’s bankruptcy attorney and has since referred clients to Spielbauer. They have known each other

20 years. Zlotoff testified that Spielbauer is an aggressive yet ethical attorney. Because he represented him in the bankruptcy matter, Zlotoff testified he would have read the decision of the superior court and the opinion of the Court of Appeal at the time of his representation, but he could not recall details during his testimony and did not have an understanding of Spielbauer’s misconduct.

We find Spielbauer’s character references do not demonstrate awareness of the *full* extent of his misconduct, as the standard requires. (*In the Matter of Acuna* (Review Dept. 1996)

3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 495, 508–509 [no mitigation for testimony of two attorneys who did not know scope of charges].)  Not only did witnesses fail to have a meaningful understanding of Spielbauer’s false payoff demand, but they also did not show they were informed that Spielbauer made a misrepresentation to the superior court and that he failed to report the fraud judgment to the State Bar. Based on this, we believe nominal mitigating weight is appropriate.

# LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE

 The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; to preserve public confidence in the profession; and to maintain high professional standards for attorneys. (Std. 1.1.) Our disciplinary analysis begins with the standards. While they are guidelines for discipline and are not mandatory, we give them great weight to promote consistency. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-92.) The Supreme Court has instructed us to follow the standards “whenever possible.” (*In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.)

In analyzing the applicable standards, we first determine which standard specifies the most severe sanction for the misconduct at issue. (Std. 1.7(a) [most severe sanction must be imposed where multiple sanctions apply].) Here, standard 2.11 is most apt as it addresses Spielbauer’s acts of moral turpitude, resulting in more serious sanctions than set forth in standard 2.12(b).[[15]](#footnote-16) It states that “[d]isbarment or actual suspension is the presumed sanction for an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, corruption, intentional or grossly negligent misrepresentation, or concealment of a material fact.” The degree of sanction under standard 2.11 is based on several factors, including “the magnitude of the misconduct; the extent to which the misconduct harmed or misled the victim, which may include the adjudicator; the impact on the administration of justice, if any; and the extent to which the misconduct related to the member’s practice of law.”

## Discipline Greater Than That Imposed by the Hearing Judge Is Recommended

Unquestionably, Spielbauer’s misconduct was serious. His misrepresentation to William LLC jeopardized its right to sell the 167 Property and was an attempt to defraud the company out of $262,347.97. Also concerning is Spielbauer’s misconduct in the superior court during the William matter, which we consider to be related to the practice of law since his declaration containing the misrepresentation regarding the payoff demand was submitted to the judge, even though Spielbauer was not the primary attorney litigating the case.

Given the broad range of discipline provided in standard 2.11 (disbarment or actual suspension), we consult case law. The hearing judge’s analysis focused on two cases: *In the Matter of Farrell* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490 (six-month actual suspension where attorney with a prior record of discipline, made false statements to a judge and failed to cooperate with OCTC) and *In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik* (Review Dept. 2005)

4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 787 (90-day actual suspension for attorney Maloney’s intentional misrepresentations to the court and failure to obey a court order). The judge found Spielbauer’s misconduct to be more closely related to the findings in *In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik* and recommended a 90-day actual suspension.

OCTC requests a six-month actual suspension and urges us to consider cases involving extortion and misrepresentations, including *Librarian v. State Bar* (1952) 38 Cal.2d 328 (six-month actual suspension where attorney extorted $41.50 by threatening to file a criminal complaint for perjury against a witness), *Bluestein v. State Bar* (1974) 13 Cal.3d 162 (six-month actual suspension where attorney extorted client’s husband to pay $1,000 in attorney’s fee based on agreement to “drop” charges in a criminal matter), *In the Matter of Harney* (1991)

3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 266 (six-month actual suspension where attorney deceived client through acts of gross negligence and improperly collected a $266,850 illegal fee, significantly harming client), and *In the Matter of Shikolnikov* (Review Dept. 2021) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 852 (six-month actual suspension where attorney made an intentional misrepresentation to a client as well as other performance and communication violations in two matters).

The cases OCTC urges us to follow do not primarily involve the misconduct at issue in the present case; therefore, we have reviewed other cases with facts more similar to Spielbauer’s misconduct to assist with our discipline determination. We consider *In the Matter of Chesnut*, *supra*, 4 Cal. State Bar. Ct. Rptr. at pp. 177-178, in which this court recommended a six-month actual suspension for an attorney found culpable under section 6068, subdivision (d), and section 6106 for making misrepresentations to two judges in a single matter. The case is comparable to the present matter because both attorneys were dishonest and committed acts of moral turpitude. Spielbauer’s misconduct is greater than Chesnut’s because he is also culpable of failing to report the civil fraud judgment entered against him to the State Bar. However, Chesnut’s misconduct was more aggravated based on his lack of candor and prior record of discipline.

We find even more germane guidance from *In the Matter of Gillis* (Review Dept. 2002)

4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 387, where an attorney was actually suspended for six months after being found culpable of committing three counts of moral turpitude, maintaining an improper business transaction with a client, and revealing client confidences. He received mitigation for practicing law for 26 years without prior discipline and aggravation for significant harm and multiple acts. (*Id.* at pp. 400-402.) Gillis’s misconduct is comparable to Spielbauer’s because both attorneys willfully violated section 6106, although Spielbauer had less instances of moral turpitude. Spielbauer’s multiple acts of misconduct involve more aggravation based on his substantial indifference and failure to pay the civil judgment. His failure to understand the wrongfulness of his misconduct, underscored by his attempts to relitigate a fully adjudicated proceeding, is of particular concern that similar misconduct may recur and calls for strong preventive measures. (See *In the Matter of Layton*, *supra*, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 380 [indifference a substantial factor in discipline imposed].) As in *Gillis*, we are mindful this is Spielbauer’s first disciplinary proceeding after decades of a discipline-free practice, and we acknowledge the nominal mitigating weight Spielbauer established for extraordinary good character. Considering the above, we find the comparable case law supports a six-month actual suspension.

## Restitution As a Condition of Probation Is Not Warranted

OCTC argues that Spielbauer should be held accountable for his fraud judgment by conditioning his actual suspension on making restitution to William LLC, in light of the superior court’s $869,276.55 civil judgment. The hearing judge refused to order restitution, reasoning that William LLC was not Spielbauer’s client and that there are other mechanisms available to satisfy the judgement. Spielbauer strongly opposes restitution and claims OCTC has conflated the issue of restitution with that of enforcement of a civil judgment.

The civil judgment against Spielbauer was itemized as follows: (1) compensatory damages of $332,547 for slander of title; (2) punitive damages of $332,550 based on intentional interference with economic advantage and slander of title; (3) attorney fees of $163,597; and (4) costs of $40,582.

We decline to recommend Spielbauer be ordered to make restitution to William LLC, a non-client entity, in connection with his disciplinary suspension. OCTC relies on several cases in which we or the California Supreme Court ordered that restitution be made to a non-client as part of discipline, but as discussed, they are all distinguishable from the instant case.[[16]](#footnote-17)

The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that restitution in the disciplinary context is not a “damage award,” and it does not “approve imposition of restitution as a means of compensating the victim of wrongdoing. [Citation].” (*Sorensen v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1036, 1044.) In *Sorensen*, the Supreme Court ordered a 30-day actual suspension and restitution in the amount of $4,375 based on Sorensen violating section 6068, subdivisions (c) and (g)—to counsel or maintain only legal or just actions, proceedings, or defenses, and to not commence or continue an action or proceeding for a corrupt motive, respectively—when Sorensen sued a court reporter contending her fee of $94.05 was excessive. Initially, the court reporter sued Sorensen in small claims court; Sorensen allowed the court reporter to obtain a default judgment, and then he sued the court reporter in superior court alleging fraud and deceit and sought actual and punitive damages. As a result, the court reporter was forced to pay over $4,000 in legal fees and costs to defeat the superior court lawsuit, which formed the basis of the restitution amount ordered in *Sorensen*. Considering the unique facts of the case, the Supreme Court provided a limited exception and extended the “protective measures and rehabilitative principles” of restitution to compensate the court reporter “when a party has been forced to incur legal fees as a result of an attorney’s violation of section 6068, subdivisions (c) and (g).” (*Id*.at pp. 1044-1045.)

Here, Spielbauer was not found culpable of violating section 6068, subdivisions (c) and (g), and the restitution amount comprising attorney fees and costs arose from William LLC successfully suing Spielbauer, rather than from William LLC defending itself in a lawsuit. Moreover, we declined to extend *Sorensen* to impose restitution to cover tort damages that a client obtained against an attorney for harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress in *In re Torres* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 138. The damages that constitute most of the civil judgment against Spielbauer arose due to causes of action based in tort, and the punitive damages portion of the judgment relates to count two, in which we did not find culpability.

Notwithstanding *Sorensen*’s limitations, the Supreme Court has imposed a restitution requirement on a disciplined attorney to a non-client in another context involving court ordered civil penalties and restitution in *cy près*. In *In re Morse*, *supra*, 11 Cal.4th at p. 190, the attorney had, in violation of section 17537.6―a consumer protection statute that imposes disclosure and other requirements on homestead exemption advertising―mailed over a five-year period to four million people solicitations offering assistance in filing homestead declarations. This generated approximately $1.9 million in revenue for Morse. (*Id*. at pp. 191-192*.*) The California Attorney General and the Alameda County District Attorney (collectively, government agencies) filed an action against Morse resulting in the superior court enjoining Morse and ordering him to pay civil penalties and restitution in *cy près* to the Consumer Protection Prosecution Trust Fund (CPPTF), which was upheld on appeal. (*Id.* at p. 193.) In Morse’s disciplinary proceeding, he was found culpable of violating section 6068, subdivision (a), requiring an attorney to support the law, and former rule 1-400(D), prohibiting misleading advertisements. (*Id*. at pp. 194-197.) The Supreme Court determined that, as part of his discipline, Morse was required to pay the civil penalties and restitution order, in part, so that if he timely made payment, his actual suspension would be reduced from three years to two years. (*Id.* at 211.)

What distinguishes *In re Morse* from the instant case is that the action charging Morse with a violation of section 17537.6 was not one based in tort. Unlike tort damages, civil money penalties’ “primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes and regulations.” (*Kizer v. County of San Mateo* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 147-148.) Similarly, the government agencies’ use of restitution in *cy près* to the CPPTF was not meant to directly compensate victims of Morse’s misconduct; it would instead be used to benefit the public generally. (*Ibid.)* Thus, restitution in *cy près* was a form of equitable relief as opposed to damages based on the individual harm to each victim. In the instant case, Spielbauer’s civil judgment was primarily driven by tort damages, which we cannot use as a justification to impose restitution per *Sorensen* and *Torres*.

Another case relied on by OCTC is *In the Matter of Taggart* (Review Dept. 2001)

4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 302, a probation revocation case. Taggart committed various violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including ethical violations relating to a former client who sued him for malpractice and to his failure to pay court-ordered discovery sanctions to his former client’s attorney. As a condition of probation, Taggart was required to pay restitution to the attorney representing Taggart’s former client in the malpractice action. In *Taggart*, this court enforced that condition in a probation revocation action after Taggart unsuccessfully attempted to have the restitution requirement discharged by filing for bankruptcy. The reasons for imposing restitution in the original disciplinary case were not discussed in *Taggart*, but the sanctions were the direct result of Taggart’s non-compliance with discovery, which forced his former client to incur attorney fees that she would have had to pay had the court not ordered sanctions.[[17]](#footnote-18) (*Id*. at p. 307.)With Spielbauer, a request for restitution concerning a court-ordered sanction is not before us; rather, the matter involves a civil judgment in tort, which cannot serve as the basis for restitution.

Based on the above, we decline to order $869,276.55 in restitution for Spielbauer’s failure to satisfy the outstanding civil fraud judgment owed to William LLC. Guided by the case law, all relevant factors, and the range of discipline suggested by standard 2.11, we recommend

that Spielbauer be suspended for two years with the imposition of a six-month period of actual suspension.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that Thomas John Spielbauer, State Bar Number 78281, be suspended from the practice of law for two years, that execution of that suspension be stayed, and that he be placed on probation for two years with the following conditions:

**1. Actual Suspension.** Spielbauer must be suspended from the practice of law for the first six months of his probation.

1. **Comply with State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct, and Probation Conditions.** Spielbauer must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation.
2. **Review Rules of Professional Conduct.** Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Spielbauer must (1) read the California Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules of Professional Conduct) and Business and Professions Code sections 6067, 6068, and 6103 through 6126, and (2) provide a declaration, under penalty of perjury, attesting to his compliance with this requirement, to the State Bar’s Office of Probation in Los Angeles (Office of Probation) with Spielbauer’s first quarterly report.
3. **Complete E-Learning Course Reviewing Rules and Statutes on Professional Conduct.** Within 90 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Spielbauer must complete the e-learning course entitled “California Rules of Professional Conduct and State Bar Act Overview.” Spielbauer must provide a declaration, under penalty of perjury, attesting to Spielbauer’s compliance with this requirement, to the Office of Probation no later than the deadline for Spielbauer’s next quarterly report due immediately after course completion.
4. **Maintain Valid Official State Bar Record Address and Other Required Contact Information.** Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Spielbauer must make certain that the State Bar Attorney Regulation and Consumer Resources Office (ARCR) has his current office address, email address, and telephone number. If he does not maintain an office, he must provide the mailing address, email address, and telephone number to be used for State Bar purposes. Spielbauer must report, in writing, any change in the above information to ARCR, within 10 days after such change, in the manner required by that office.
5. **Meet and Cooperate with Office of Probation**. Within 15 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Spielbauer must schedule a meeting with his assigned Probation Case Coordinator to discuss the terms and conditions of his discipline and, within 30 days after the effective date of the court’s order, must participate in such meeting. Unless otherwise instructed by the Office of Probation, Spielbauer may meet with the Probation Case Coordinator in person or by telephone. During the probation period, Spielbauer must promptly meet with representatives of the Office of Probation as requested by it and, subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by it and provide to it any other information requested by it.
6. **State Bar Court Retains Jurisdiction/Appear Before and Cooperate with State Bar Court.** During Spielbauer’s probation period, the State Bar Court retains jurisdiction over him to address issues concerning compliance with probation conditions. During this period, Spielbauer must appear before the State Bar Court as required by the court or by the Office of Probation after written notice mailed to his official State Bar record address, as provided above. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Spielbauer must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by the court and must provide any other information the court requests.
7. **Quarterly and Final Reports**.

**Deadlines for Reports.** Spielbauermustsubmitwritten quarterly reports to the Office of Probation no later than each January 10 (covering October 1 through December 31 of the prior year), April 10 (covering January 1 through March 31), July 10 (covering April 1 through June 30), and October 10 (covering July 1 through September 30) within the period of probation. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date and cover the extended deadline. In addition to all quarterly reports, Spielbauer must submit a final report no earlier than 10 days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.

**Contents of Reports.** Spielbauer must answer, under penalty of perjury, all inquiries contained in the quarterly report form provided by the Office of Probation, including stating whether he has complied with the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct during the applicable quarter or period. All reports must be: (1) submitted on the form provided by the Office of Probation; (2) signed and dated after the completion of the period for which the report is being submitted (except for the final report); (3) filled out completely and signed under penalty of perjury; and (4) submitted to the Office of Probation on or before each report’s due date.

**Submission of Reports.** All reports must be submitted by: (1) fax or email to the Office of Probation; (2) personal delivery to the Office of Probation; (3) certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Office of Probation (postmarked on or before the due date); or (4) other tracked-service provider, such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service, etc. (physically delivered to such provider on or before the due date).

**Proof of Compliance.** Spielbauer is directed to maintain proof of compliance with the above requirements for each such report for a minimum of one year after either the period of probation or the period of actual suspension has ended, whichever is longer. Spielbauer is required to present such proof upon request by the State Bar, the Office of Probation, or the State Bar Court.

1. **State Bar Ethics School.**  Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Spielbauer must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and he will not receive MCLE credit for attending this session. If he provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the Ethics School after the date of this opinion but before the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order in this matter, Spielbauer will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward his duty to comply with this condition.
2. **Commencement of Probation/Compliance with Probation Conditions.**  The period of probation will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. At the expiration of the probation period, if Spielbauer has complied with all conditions of probation, the period of stayed suspension will be satisfied and that suspension will be terminated.
3. **Proof of Compliance with Rule 9.20 Obligation.** Spielbauer is directed to maintain, for a minimum of one year after commencement of probation, proof of compliance with the Supreme Court’s order that he comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.20(a) and (c), as recommended below. Such proof must include: the names and addresses of all individuals and entities to whom Spielbauer sent notification pursuant to rule 9.20; a copy of each notification letter sent to each recipient; the original receipt or postal authority tracking document for each notification sent; the originals of all returned receipts and notifications of non-delivery; and a copy of the completed compliance affidavit filed by him with the State Bar Court. He is required to present such proof upon request by the State Bar, the Office of Probation, or the State Bar Court.

# MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION

We further recommend that Thomas John Spielbauer be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter and to provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar’s Office of Probation within the same period. Failure to do so may result in suspension. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.10(b).) If Spielbauer provides satisfactory evidence of the taking and passage of the above examination after the date of this opinion but before the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order in this matter, he will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence toward his duty to comply with this requirement.

# CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 9.20

We further recommend that Thomas John Spielbauer be ordered to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and to perform the acts specified in (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the date the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter is filed.[[18]](#footnote-19) (*Athearn v. State Bar* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 38, 45 [the operative date for identification of clients being represented in pending matters and others to be notified is the filing date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline].) Failure to do so may result in disbarment or suspension.

# MONETARY SANCTIONS

We do not recommend the imposition of monetary sanctions in this matter as this disciplinary proceeding commenced prior to April 1, 2020. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.137(H).)

# COSTS[[19]](#footnote-20)

We further recommend that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment, and may be collected by the State Bar through any means permitted by law. Unless the time for payment of discipline costs is extended pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 6086.10, costs assessed against an attorney who is actually suspended or disbarred must be paid as a condition of applying for reinstatement or return to active status.

 RIBAS, J.

WE CONCUR:

HONN, P. J.

McGILL, J.

**No. SBC-19-O-30700**

***In the Matter of***

**THOMAS JOHN SPIELBAUER**

*Hearing Judge*

**Hon. Manjari Chawla**

*Counsel for the Parties*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| For Office of Chief Trial Counsel: | Alex James HackertOffice of Chief Trial CounselThe State Bar of California845 S. Figueroa StreetLos Angeles, CA 90017-2515 |
| For Respondent, In pro. per. | Thomas John SpielbauerSpielbauer Law Office3130 Balfour Road, D #231Brentwood, CA 94513 |

1. All further references to sections are to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise noted. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. *167 E. William LLC v. Devine Blessings, et al*. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 1-10-CV176152) (William matter). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. At all times relevant to Spielbauer’s misconduct in the William matter, discussed *post*, former Civil Code section 2943, enacted January 1, 2010, and effective through December 31, 2013, was in effect. All references to Civil Code section 2943 in this opinion are to the former version of the statute. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The facts included in this opinion are based on the trial testimony, documentary evidence, and the hearing judge’s factual findings, which are entitled to great weight. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.155(A).) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Further references to Dennis Spielbauer are to his first name only to differentiate him from his brother to whom we refer to by their shared surname. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. “‘Payoff demand statement’ means a written statement, prepared in response to a written demand made by an entitled person or authorized agent, setting forth the amounts required as of the date of preparation by the beneficiary, to fully satisfy all obligations secured by the loan that is the subject of the payoff demand statement.” (Civ. Code § 2943, subd. (a)(5).) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Civil Code section 2943, subdivision (c), states in pertinent part: “A beneficiary, or his or her authorized agent, shall, on the written demand of an entitled person, or his or her authorized agent, prepare and deliver a payoff demand statement to the person demanding it within 21 days of the receipt of the demand.” The section the superior court found Spielbauer violated―Civil Code section 2943, subdivision (e)(4)―provides in part, “[i]f a beneficiary for a period of 21 days after receipt of the written demand willfully fails to prepare and deliver the statement, he or she is liable to the entitled person for all damages which he or she may sustain by reason of the refusal . . . .” [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. All culpability findings in this opinion are established by clear and convincing evidence. (*Conservatorship of Wendland* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 552 [clear and convincing evidence leaves no substantial doubt and is sufficiently strong to command unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind].) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. As discussed below, unlike the hearing judge, we do not find culpability under count two. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Spielbauer also asserts the hearing judge unfairly precluded him from proffering expert testimony to support his position regarding the underlying deed of trust. As discussed below, the hearing judge’s denial of his request to proffer expert testimony and exhibits on issues fully litigated and barred by collateral estoppel was proper. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Spielbauer relied on *Friery v. Sutter Buttes Savings Bank* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 869 and the arguments in the law review article, *Subrogation of Mortgages in California: A Comparison with the Restatement and Proposals for Change*, (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review 1633, to support his position that he was permitted to modify the note. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct. All further references to standards are to this source. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Under standard 1.5(b), the hearing judge’s decision states Spielbauer was found culpable of two acts of misconduct. In fact, she found him culpable of four counts of misconduct, although the judge correctly concluded that his culpability under counts one and two would not be assigned any additional disciplinary weight. (See *In the Matter of Moriarty* (Review Dept. 2017) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 520 [no disciplinary weight assigned for additional culpability findings based on same facts].) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Standard 2.12(b) provides that reproval is the presumed sanction for a violation of the duties required of an attorney under section 6068, subdivision (o). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. We also find dissimilar situations where an attorney was found to have breached his or her fiduciary duty and diverted funds or misappropriated money owed to a non-client and restitution was ordered. (See, e.g., *Galardi v. State Bar*, *supra*, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 694-695; *In the Matter of McCarthy* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 364, 373.) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. The Supreme Court has previously ordered restitution as part of a disciplinary matter when it covers a court-ordered sanction. (See *Hunniecutt v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 362, 374 [restitution required to be paid to former client where former client received court sanction due to attorney’s failure to timely respond to complaint].) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Spielbaueris required to file a rule 9.20(c) affidavit even if he has no clients to notify on the date the Supreme Court files its order in this proceeding. (*Powers v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.) In addition to being punished as a crime or contempt, an attorney’s failure to comply with rule 9.20 is, inter alia, cause for disbarment, suspension, revocation of any pending disciplinary probation, and denial of an application for reinstatement after disbarment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.20(d).) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. In his briefs on review, Spielbauer argues against the imposition of disciplinary costs. He claims that awarding costs pursuant to section 6086.10 is constitutionally invalid, illegal, and he raises additional challenges based on OCTC’s ability to determine “reasonable costs” in disciplinary proceedings. As this court held in *In the* *Matter of Langfus* (Review Dept. 1994)

3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 161, 168, “No provision is made for challenging the cost award prior to the Supreme Court’s order.” Yet the statutory scheme allows Spielbauer to seek relief “*after* authorization for costs is included in a Supreme Court order of suspension or disbarment.” (*Ibid*.) Therefore, Spielbauer may seek relief from an order that imposes costs. This court does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of the disciplinary cost structure; however, the Supreme Court’s plenary jurisdiction over attorney discipline includes jurisdiction to review an attorney’s constitutional challenges to the discipline process. (*In re Attorney Discipline System* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 582, 592.) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)